Living well as an ultimate end
Aristotle compares the ends pursued in action, distinguishing things chosen for further results from happiness chosen for itself. Agreement on its name does not remove disagreement about what it consists in.
Self-sufficiency does not mean a solitary person needing no one. Book I includes family, friends and fellow citizens in its account, examining a life worth choosing as a whole rather than an isolated moment of feeling.
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Possessing virtue and exercising it
The function argument moves from growth and perception shared with other living things toward human rational activity, then relates performing well to excellence. Aristotle accordingly proposes activity of soul in accordance with virtue across a complete life.
Possessing a state differs from exercising it: a sleeping or inactive person may retain a disposition without acting. An analogy with competitors receiving prizes emphasizes actual participation rather than merely having the relevant attributes.
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External conditions and reversals of fortune
The text does not make virtue independent of circumstances. Friends, resources and opportunities can support good action, while serious misfortunes can obstruct it. Happiness is therefore not promised through a change of attitude alone.
Book I asks whether a life can be judged happy before death and distinguishes small setbacks from major reversals. Its answer connects sustained activity, a complete life and sufficient external conditions. This is a philosophical argument, not a finding established by modern psychological measurement.
References: [1]