Signatures protect record sets
DNSSEC associates RRsets with signatures in RRSIG records and publishes verification keys in DNSKEY records. This protects zone data rather than creating a query-specific encrypted channel to an individual server.
RRSIG includes inception and expiration times, so mathematical signature verification is not the only condition. Cache lifetime, signature validity and key state all matter; a previously validated answer is not automatically trustworthy forever.
Connecting a trust anchor to a child zone
A received key is not trusted merely because it is a key. A validator builds from a configured trust anchor; the parent’s DS record identifies the child DNSKEY through digest information across the delegation boundary. The records reside on different sides of that boundary.
A negative answer also needs evidence rather than silence. NSEC, NSEC3 and subsequent mechanisms support authenticated denial, with applicable rules governing forms, caching and validation failure.
Data authentication differs from channel confidentiality
DNSSEC does not conceal query names or answer contents; confidential transport is a separate mechanism. An encrypted query channel likewise does not automatically replace authentication of zone data and delegations.
Successful validation establishes the applicable DNSSEC chain and rules, not honest website content, perpetual reachability or immunity to resource exhaustion. HTTPS service-identity checks remain separate, and later algorithm and denial-of-existence updates must be considered.