The Treaty of Gulistan: Possession and an Unfinished Frontier

On October 24, 1813, or October 12 in the Russian calendar, the Russian Empire and Qajar Persia concluded peace at Gulistan in Karabakh. The preamble identified the meeting place as a Russian camp beside the Zeyva River. Russia was represented by Nikolai Rtishchev, its military and administrative chief in the Caucasus, and Persia by Mirza Abul Hasan Khan.

Negotiations rested on an unequal military balance. Persian forces commanded by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza had been defeated at Aslanduz in 1812, after which Russian troops captured Lankaran. British diplomat Gore Ouseley mediated, but changes in Anglo-Russian relations also limited military support for Persia. Watson's history records Ouseley ordering British officers to stop participating in the war against Russia, leaving only a small number behind.

The treaty therefore did not redraw borders on an empty map. Territories already controlled by Russian forces and rights Persia still hoped to retain formed the immediate conditions of negotiation.

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Article II adopted the principle of maintaining actual possession at the time. Its boundary description successively named the Mughan plain, crossings of the Aras River, tributaries, and mountains, referring to existing limits of khanates including Karabakh, Nakhchivan, and Erivan. This depended on local names and current control, not a completed precise survey.

Talysh had changed hands repeatedly during the war, so the treaty specifically required commissioners from both sides to investigate jointly after conclusion and ratification, listing lands, villages, rivers, valleys, and mountains before drawing the boundary. It also allowed other encroachments beyond the agreed line to be addressed. A commission procedure acknowledged unresolved matters at signature.

Article III recorded the Persian sovereign's recognition of Russian possession of Karabakh, Ganja, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Quba, Baku, and the Talysh lands Russia then controlled, along with Dagestan, Georgia, and other regions. Erivan and Nakhchivan were not ceded in their entirety by this peace; the outcome of 1828 cannot be projected back into 1813.

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Article IV incorporated succession into interstate relations. Russia promised, if needed, to assist the heir designated by the Persian sovereign. In a dispute among princes, however, intervention required a request from the reigning monarch. The provision supplied a treaty basis for future assistance but did not name Abbas Mirza or authorize unlimited intervention.

Article V treated commercial and military navigation differently. Merchant ships of both parties could sail the Caspian and call at one another's coasts, receiving assistance in shipwrecks. Rights concerning naval flags and warships were reserved to Russia alone. Persia faced a naval restriction, not a prohibition on all Persian vessels entering the Caspian.

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Article VI required the release of prisoners of war and captive residents, regardless of religion, within three months of conclusion and signature, with provisions and travel expenses to the handover point at Karaklis. Fugitives wishing to return could do so, while those unwilling could not be compelled; an amnesty was also granted. These clauses concerned residents' choices but are not direct proof that everyone was released on schedule.

Articles VII–X established procedures for diplomatic and commercial intercourse. Consuls or agents protected trade, and merchants carrying certificates from their governments or border officials could enter, reside, and depart. Debt and other disputes could be handled by consuls, agents, or local authorities. Article IX capped import and export duties at five percent of value and prohibited repeated duties on the same goods along the route.

These arrangements sought to reduce extra charges and risks to persons and property in border trade. Permission to trade and seek redress did not automatically establish compliance at every checkpoint or demonstrate any particular increase in trade volume.

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Article XI required representatives immediately after signature to notify the relevant regions to cease military operations. It also required both sovereigns personally to sign formal ratifications and deliver them to their representatives within three months. The signed treaty and the later exchange of sovereign instruments were therefore different procedures.

The U.S. State Department's 1978 boundary study, citing the treaty heading in British and Foreign State Papers, records the exchange of ratifications at Tiflis in September 1814. The actual exchange came later than the three months envisaged. Military cessation was to begin through notification after signature, while formal ratification was completed later. The date in 1813, the proposed deadline, and the actual confirmation in 1814 should not be conflated.

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Demarcation was the most conspicuous implementation difficulty. Watson records that new arguments continued even after commissioners investigated disputed areas. Russian and Persian authorities interpreted differently which lands belonged to the possession to be maintained. Preserving the status quo was easier only when both sides agreed what that status quo actually was.

The treaty collection compiled by the government of British India records Russia's occupation of and refusal to leave the Gokcha area claimed by Persia, with the dispute continuing until war resumed in 1826. The Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 changed the territorial settlement again. Gulistan ended one war and embodied Russian control in the Caucasus in a diplomatic instrument, but did not establish a complete frontier order capable of removing subsequent territorial disputes.

References: [2] [4]