The Treaty of Turkmanchay: Conclusion and Implementation

The Treaty of Turkmanchay ended the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828. Boundary disputes left by the earlier Treaty of Gulistan had persisted, and Iran’s Qajar dynasty and the Russian Empire again went to war in the Caucasus. Russian forces subsequently captured Erivan, Tabriz, and other places, leaving the Iranian negotiators at a severe disadvantage.

Robert Grant Watson’s A History of Persia records repeated negotiations over territorial concessions and indemnities in late 1827, with the British envoy John Macdonald helping to guarantee payments and facilitate communication. The two sides concluded the treaty at Turkmanchay on February 22, 1828, or February 10 in the Russian calendar. Russia’s plenipotentiaries were Ivan Paskevich and Alexander Obreskov; Crown Prince Abbas Mirza represented Iran, and the signature of Foreign Minister Mirza Abu’l-Hasan Khan also appeared at the end of the treaty.

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Article XVI required the plenipotentiaries to send immediate notification everywhere that hostilities were to cease once they had signed. The two sovereigns still had to ratify the treaty and exchange instruments of ratification within four months, or sooner if possible. Orders to cease hostilities could therefore precede the separate procedures for sovereign ratification and the exchange of documents.

The instrument of ratification included in Russia’s Complete Collection of Laws states that Nicholas I confirmed the treaty in its entirety at St. Petersburg on March 20, 1828, in the Russian calendar. This was the date of Russian ratification: it cannot replace the signing date or automatically be equated with the exchange of ratifications or a common date of entry into force. Four months was the stipulated deadline; the provision alone does not establish that the exchange actually took place on any particular day.

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Article III stipulated that Iran would cede the khanates of Erivan and Nakhchivan to Russia and hand over their administrative archives and public documents within six months of signing. These included records needed for taxation, landholding, and local government, so the territorial transfer also required cooperation from administrative authorities.

Article IV described the boundary in detail: some stretches followed the Aras River, while others followed rivers, ridges, and watersheds as far as the Caspian Sea. It cannot be reduced to a boundary running entirely along the Aras. The supplementary articles also required both sides to appoint representatives to draw boundary maps, submit them for their respective approvals, and then exchange them. Moving from a written boundary definition to surveying on the ground required further work by designated officials.

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Article VI required Iran to pay an indemnity of twenty million silver rubles, with payment deadlines and guarantees set out in supplementary articles. These divided the sum into installments and linked Russia’s temporary occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan to the progress of payments; the area around Khoy was retained as security for the balance. Missing deadlines could even have the grave consequence of further territorial losses.

Implementation still involved renegotiation. Watson records that Russia later agreed to withdraw from Azerbaijan outside Khoy after receiving six and a half kururs of tomans, less than the seven kururs originally specified for this stage of withdrawal. The British envoy provided 200,000 tomans on condition that the relevant obligations in the Anglo-Persian treaty be revised, and the crown prince supplied another 50,000 tomans.

The same work records that, as the August 1828 deadline approached, Russian troops withdrew from Khoy only after funds had been raised and Macdonald had guaranteed 100,000 tomans of the sum. Payment, external guarantees, and withdrawal were interdependent. Signing the treaty therefore cannot be portrayed as the day on which the entire indemnity was paid and the occupation immediately ended.

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Article VIII distinguished merchant ships from warships. Russian and Persian merchant vessels both retained rights to navigate the Caspian Sea and call at its shores, and to receive assistance in distress; Russia alone had the right to maintain warships there. Summarizing this as Persia’s loss of all Caspian navigation rights obscures the different arrangements for civilian trade and military power.

Article X allowed the establishment of consuls or commercial agents and left detailed provisions for protecting trade and the two countries’ subjects to a separate commercial instrument. Watson’s account of that arrangement includes a five-percent ad valorem duty on imports and exports and Russian consular jurisdiction over disputes between Russian subjects in Persia. Taxation and judicial rules gave institutional form to Russia’s advantages.

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Article XV granted amnesty for wartime conduct to inhabitants and officials of Iranian Azerbaijan. It allowed them one year to move with their families to Russian territory and sell or take their movable property without additional obstruction or taxes and charges; the period for disposing of immovable property was five years. The provision did not identify its subjects as a single ethnic group, so it cannot simply be recast as an order for the compulsory migration of Armenians alone.

Article XIII separately required the release and return of prisoners of war and captive subjects within four months, with handover at Abbasabad; the return of those delayed by distance or other causes could still be demanded. Article XIV provided that extradition would not be requested for defectors and deserters who had joined the other side before or during the war. For new cases of desertion during the temporary occupation, however, the supplementary articles required reciprocal return.

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The treaty restored peace between the two countries while confirming Russia’s territorial, indemnity, and military advantages. It also recognized Abbas Mirza’s position as heir to the throne, showing that the Iranian dynasty sought to preserve dynastic continuity even as it made concessions.

Ali Gheissari’s research shows that Qajar officials sometimes regarded acceptance of disadvantageous treaties as a way to preserve sovereignty, while public opinion might view the same act as a dynastic failure. The treaty’s jurisdictional privileges also became a precedent for other countries seeking similar arrangements through most-favored-nation treatment. Turkmanchay’s long-term effects thus encompassed borders, public finances, jurisdiction, and the dynasty’s political credibility.

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