The Treaty of Portsmouth: Conclusion and Implementation

The Russo-Japanese War drew Korea and northeastern China into the rivalry between the two powers. On June 8, 1905, acting US Secretary of State Francis Loomis telegraphed Minister Lloyd Griscom in Japan, conveying President Theodore Roosevelt's proposal for peace talks; the same message went to Russia. It called for direct negotiations between the belligerents' plenipotentiaries, with the United States offering to help arrange the time and place. Roosevelt's mediation and Japan and Russia's control of seats at the negotiating table were distinct aspects of the process.

Negotiations subsequently took place at Portsmouth in the United States. On September 5, Japanese representatives Komura Jutarō and Takahira Kogorō and Russian representatives Sergei Witte and Roman Rosen signed the treaty. Ian Nish's study emphasizes that China, directly affected by the war and territorial arrangements, did not participate in its conclusion. Understanding the peace settlement requires looking beyond the text agreed by the two powers in America.

References: [1] [2] [7]

Article Two recognized Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, and Russia undertook not to obstruct Japanese measures of guidance, protection, and control. This was Russia's undertaking to Japan, not participation by the Korean people in deciding their own status. Article Nine ceded southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands to Japan, using latitude 50° north as the boundary, and provided for demarcation and associated military restrictions.

In northeastern China, Article Three required in principle the withdrawal of both powers' troops and restoration of Chinese administration, with separate arrangements for the Liaodong leased territory. Articles Five and Six concerned the transfer of the Port Arthur and Dalian leaseholds, the railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, its branches, and associated coal mines, explicitly subject to Chinese government consent. Transferring rights from Russia to Japan did not make those areas Japanese sovereign territory. Nor did the treaty award Japan a conventional war indemnity; settlement of prisoner-maintenance costs under Article Thirteen was a separate matter.

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September 5 was the date of signature. Article Fourteen separately required that, after ratification by both sovereigns, notifications be exchanged through the French minister in Tokyo and the US embassy in St. Petersburg. The treaty would enter into force upon delivery of the last notification, followed by formal exchange of instruments of ratification in Washington. That formal exchange therefore cannot be treated as the sole condition for entry into force.

Takahira's note of October 14 reported that the Japanese emperor had ratified the treaty that day. US chargé Spencer Eddy's October 16 report recorded the Russian emperor's ratification on the 14th and Eddy's own delivery of Japan's notification to the Russian foreign minister on the 15th. Another note from Takahira confirmed that the French minister had also delivered Russia's notification to Japan on the 15th. Under Article Fourteen and these delivery records, the treaty entered into force on October 15, 1905, after signature but before the formal November exchange.

References: [2] [3] [7]

The treaty's additional provisions required withdrawal to begin after entry into force and finish within eighteen months, while allowing railway guards within specified limits. On October 30, 1905, military representatives signed a further protocol on withdrawal and railway transfer at Sipingjie station, translating broad principles into procedures for phased retreat through designated areas, troop limits, and handover commissions.

The protocol specified withdrawal stages for late 1905 and June and August 1906, requiring completion by April 15, 1907. A commission of officers and transport specialists was to manage railway transfers. A separate contemporary memorandum still required nonlocal residents to obtain permission to cross areas occupied by the two armies. Peace thus first took practical shape through checkpoints, travel arrangements, and railway handovers, rather than an immediate disappearance of armies and wartime controls after signature. These documents establish implementation arrangements; prescribed deadlines alone do not prove full compliance.

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On December 22, 1905, China and Japan signed a treaty and additional agreement in Beijing concerning northeastern China. The main treaty explicitly recorded China's consent to the transfers in Articles Five and Six of the Portsmouth treaty and required Japan, as far as possible, to observe the earlier relevant Sino-Russian agreements. This was another legal step required to implement leasehold and railway rights, not a reason to retrospectively change the earlier Russo-Japanese treaty's effective date.

The additional agreement also concerned opening more places to trade, transferring public property after withdrawal, the Andong–Fengtian railway, and conditions for removing railway guards. Nish stresses that the Beijing negotiations were an indispensable part of the postwar settlement: China sought restoration of its rights, while Japan sought to turn battlefield gains into rights it could exploit over the long term. Russia's surrender of some interests did not automatically eliminate foreign privileges on Chinese territory.

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Repatriating prisoners likewise required communication and practical coordination. On January 31, 1906, acting US Secretary of State Robert Bacon informed the Japanese chargé that the United States was still asking Russia about prisoner exchanges and the locations of Russian mines in Korea, Sakhalin, and elsewhere; telegraphic communication had previously been difficult. This brief letter shows that safe navigation and the return of personnel remained unfinished business months after the treaty entered into force.

The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the legal state of war between Japan and Russia and redistributed power and transport interests in East Asia. Implementation proceeded through successive steps, including ratification notices, military protocols, and negotiations with China. Distinguishing these steps makes it possible to understand both the achievements of diplomatic compromise and the reality that northeastern China and Korea did not thereby gain autonomy to determine their own futures.

References: [2] [6]