The Treaty of Shimonoseki: Conclusion and Implementation

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, known in Chinese as the Treaty of Maguan, was the peace treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. As Qing forces suffered defeats in Liaodong and at Weihaiwei, the court sought peace. An earlier mission to Japan by Zhang Yinhuan and Shao Youlian had failed to advance negotiations because Japan considered their authorization inadequate. In March 1895, Li Hongzhang arrived in Shimonoseki with a delegation including Li Jingfang and advised by former U.S. secretary of state John Foster.

Japan was represented by Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. After talks began on March 20, armistice terms became the first point of contention. On March 24, Li Hongzhang was shot and wounded after a meeting, but negotiations continued. The armistice concluded on March 30 applied to Fengtian, Zhili, and Shandong; it did not immediately stop operations in every theater. Military pressure and diplomacy continued together.

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The plenipotentiaries signed the treaty at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. Its preamble set out the positions and powers of Li Hongzhang, Li Jingfang, Ito Hirobumi, and Mutsu Munemitsu. Article 11 required ratification by both emperors and designated Chefoo for the exchange of instruments. The representatives' signatures did not mean ratification was already complete.

The instruments were exchanged at Chefoo on May 8, bringing the treaty into force. In a telegram to Secretary of State Gresham the following day, U.S. minister to China Charles Denby reported completion of the exchange and also mentioned Japan's agreement not to retain Liaodong permanently. Article 10 linked the cessation of offensive military operations to the exchange, while indemnity payments, withdrawals, and the Taiwan handover had their own subsequent deadlines. They cannot be described as all completed on the same day.

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Article 1 required the Qing government to recognize Korea's complete independence and autonomy and end tributary and ceremonial relations incompatible with that status. It addressed Qing relations with Korea; Korea was not listed as territory ceded to Japan. Article 2 ceded a defined area in southern Fengtian, Taiwan and its adjacent islands, and the Penghu Islands, together with associated public facilities.

Article 3 provided for demarcation of the southern Fengtian boundary on the ground. Article 5 separately prescribed the Taiwan handover: representatives were to be sent after ratification was exchanged, with transfer completed within two months. Residents of ceded areas had two years to sell their property and leave; those remaining afterward could be regarded by Japan as Japanese subjects. Territorial provisions thus concerned personal status, property disposal, and administrative takeover, not merely lines on a map.

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Article 4 set a war indemnity of 200 million Kuping taels, originally payable in eight installments, the first two of 50 million each. Full payment within three years would remove the interest obligation. Article 8 made Japan's temporary occupation of Weihaiwei a guarantee of performance and linked withdrawal to indemnity payment and implementation of the commercial treaty. Weihaiwei's status as security differed from that of the territories permanently ceded under Article 2.

Actual payment also required decisions about currency and settlement. Matsukata Masayoshi's fiscal report records a separate agreement in October 1895 to pay in sterling in London. Its receipts table shows the war indemnity fully paid on May 7, 1898, with interest already paid credited toward principal under the early-settlement conditions. To raise funds, the Qing government borrowed from foreign financial institutions against customs and other revenues. The treaty's silver amount thus became a multiyear arrangement of debt and income.

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The cession of Liaodong provoked intervention by Russia, France, and Germany, after which Japan accepted demands to return it. Diplomatic retreat nevertheless required new written procedures. On November 8, 1895, Li Hongzhang and Japan's minister to China, Hayashi Tadasu, signed a treaty in Beijing returning the southern portion of Fengtian Province previously ceded to Japan.

The new agreement required China to pay an additional 30 million Kuping taels, with Japanese forces to withdraw completely within three months of payment, and canceled the original peace treaty's related boundary-demarcation arrangements. Matsukata's accounts record receipt of the Liaodong redemption payment on November 16. These 30 million taels were not an installment of the original 200 million war indemnity, nor did their payment cancel the cession of Taiwan and Penghu.

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In Taiwan, written cession did not automatically produce a peaceful takeover. Local officials and gentry organized the Republic of Formosa to reject the transfer, while Japan gained control through military action. When Li Jingfang conducted the formal handover aboard a Japanese warship off Keelung on June 2, 1895, war and resistance on the island had not ended.

Japanese troops subsequently occupied Taipei and advanced south, entering Tainan in October. Diplomatic transfer, military control, and acceptance by local society were therefore three separate dimensions. To say that the treaty's entry into force in May or the June handover immediately ended resistance across the island erases the following months of fighting and misrepresents implementation of the cession.

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Article 6 provided for opening Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, allowed Japanese subjects to engage in manufacturing and import machinery at treaty ports, and expanded waterways open to Japanese steam navigation. The parties also had to conclude a separate treaty of commerce and navigation, giving concrete effect to these rights through new institutional arrangements.

American diplomatic papers from 1897 preserve a later dispute over whether an American insurance company in Hangzhou could maintain an office outside the designated settlement. Acting on legal advice, Sherman did not support an unconditional expansion of residence rights and interpreted the 1895 peace treaty together with the 1896 commercial treaty. The indemnity's use also had consequences: Schiltz's research connects Japan's sterling receipts, military expansion, and gold-standard arrangements. The Shimonoseki settlement ended a war while opening new fiscal, territorial, and commercial relationships.

References: [1] [6] [7]