1956 Marked a New Stage in Armed Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping forces are not a standing army established once in 1956 and maintained thereafter with an unchanged organization. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization had already deployed unarmed observers in 1948. The first United Nations Emergency Force, formed during the 1956 Suez Crisis, expanded peacekeeping into a multinational operation with military units.

Israeli and Anglo-French military action against Egypt made ceasefire supervision urgent. After Britain and France blocked relevant action in the Security Council, the issue moved to an emergency special session of the General Assembly. Canadian foreign minister Lester Pearson promoted an international force, and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld translated it into deployable arrangements. Its task was to help end hostilities and create conditions for foreign forces to withdraw.

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Turning Resolutions into a Command System

On November 5, 1956, General Assembly Resolution 1000 established a UN command for an emergency international force and appointed Major-General Burns, chief of staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, as commander. It authorized him to recruit officers from observers and member states, excluding personnel from permanent Security Council members. On November 7, the assembly further approved organizational and operational principles and authorized the Secretary-General to implement them.

The assembly also created an advisory committee of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan. Military orders passed from the force commander to national contingents, while the Secretary-General exercised UN command through him. The 1957 report described headquarters personnel, operations and logistics sections, together with legal, communications and medical staff. Civilian administrators came mainly from the UN Secretariat.

References: [1] [2] [3] [6]

National Contributions Did Not Mean Separate National Operations

States supplied personnel and units rather than the UN recruiting an army detached from national forces. After the Brazilian contingent arrived in February 1957, strength reached approximately 6,000. The ten early contributing countries were Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

National contingents retained their organization but followed unified command. Denmark and Norway voluntarily combined in one battalion under alternating national commanders, while a Norwegian medical company served the entire force. Canada's 1957 exchange of notes with the UN specified that discipline remained the national commander's responsibility, with reporting to the force commander, and withdrawal required adequate advance notice. International command, national jurisdiction and continuing availability of troops each needed separate arrangements.

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From Separating Armies to Everyday Cooperation

The force initially established a buffer zone in the Suez Canal area and advanced toward Port Said as Anglo-French troops withdrew. Beyond guard duty and patrols, it protected power stations and embarkation areas, cleared mines, helped exchange captured and detained persons, and investigated ceasefire complaints. Later it replaced withdrawing Israeli troops in Sinai, repaired roads and passages, and assisted prisoner-of-war exchanges.

During a brief administrative gap after entering Gaza in March 1957, the force worked with United Nations Relief and Works Agency staff to protect public facilities and important records and borrowed the agency's diesel fuel to keep electricity running. Routine supplies arrived by sea at Port Said and continued by rail to Rafah; the Royal Canadian Air Force transported mail, urgent supplies and personnel. Cooperation thus took concrete form in ports, railways, hospitals and communications networks.

References: [2]

Paying for and Supplying the Force

Troop commitments also required common payment arrangements. Resolution 1122 of November 26, 1956 established a special emergency-force account separate from the regular budget, with an initial authorization of $10 million, allowing advances from the Working Capital Fund before contributions arrived. This was an authorized amount, not proof that the same sum had entered the account that day.

On December 21, Resolution 1089 provided that the UN would bear expenses beyond pay, equipment, supplies and services supplied free by states. The first $10 million was assessed on members according to the 1957 regular-budget scale, with additional expenses left for further consideration. Canada's exchange of notes still reserved cost allocation for a supplementary agreement, showing that the arrangements were not settled at once. Funding did not eliminate logistical difficulties: the report described diverse vehicle models, hard-to-obtain spare parts and rations that had to accommodate national dietary differences.

References: [2] [3] [4] [5]

Consent, Restraint and Unresolved Questions

The first Emergency Force was not tasked with forcibly occupying territory. Host-state consent determined where it could deploy. Israel did not consent, so border patrols operated on the Egyptian side. The Secretary-General's 1957 report also distinguished the accepted right to fire in self-defense from the unresolved authority to fire at nighttime border-crossers; the latter cannot be described as an established authorization.

While recognizing greater calm along the border, the report warned that it could be interrupted at any time. Peacekeeping could reduce contact and accidental escalation but not replace a political settlement. The force's departure after Egypt requested withdrawal in 1967 exposed the vulnerability of dependence on continuing host-state consent. The significance of 1956 lay in establishing a temporary multinational method of cooperation, whose effective scope and limits both informed later peacekeeping.

References: [2] [6]