The Sykes–Picot Agreement: Diplomatic Notes, Zones, and Postwar Implementation

The Sykes–Picot Agreement emerged during the First World War to address postwar arrangements for the Ottoman Empire’s Asian territories. Britain’s Mark Sykes and the French diplomat François Georges-Picot took part in negotiations in London, coordinating the two countries’ demands through zones marked on a map and reciprocal assurances. Russian consent was also an important part of this diplomatic process.

Drawing on diplomatic archives, Loevy states that the British and French governments approved the draft on February 4 and 8, 1916, respectively. French ambassador to Britain Paul Cambon and British foreign secretary Edward Grey subsequently exchanged notes. Grey’s note of May 16 confirmed British acceptance and restated the agreement. It was concluded through intergovernmental correspondence, not a single signing ceremony by the two negotiators whose names it bears. Nor should an unsupported date for parliamentary ratification or uniform implementation be invented.

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The text did not designate every area as a direct British or French colony. In the areas marked A and B, the two countries declared themselves prepared to recognize and protect an independent state or confederation of states under Arab chiefs. France would nevertheless have priority for enterprises and local loans in A, and Britain in B. If Arab governments requested foreign advisers, the respective power would have the exclusive right to provide them. The proposed independence thus coexisted with exclusive foreign privileges.

In the blue and red areas, France and Britain respectively could establish such direct or indirect administration as they considered appropriate, under arrangements reached with the Arab side. The brown area was intended for international administration, whose form would require consultation with Russia, the other allies, and representatives of the Sharif of Mecca. The colors represented different political arrangements; they should not all be recast as already settled boundaries of present-day states.

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Britain was to obtain the ports of Haifa and Acre. Alexandretta was to become a free port for British trade, without discrimination against Britain in port dues, access to facilities, or treatment of goods and ships. Haifa was to offer corresponding guarantees to French commerce. Goods transiting French- or British-controlled areas were also to receive rail transport and transit facilities.

The agreement proposed maintaining Ottoman tariffs for twenty years throughout the blue, red, A, and B areas. Duties could not be increased, nor ad valorem duties converted to specific duties, without both powers’ consent. There were to be no internal customs barriers between the areas, and duties collected at the port of entry were to pass to the administration of the goods’ final destination. Imperial rivalry thus concerned port revenue, transport routes, and market access as well as possession of territory.

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Extensions of the Baghdad Railway were subject to reciprocal restrictions. Until a line linking Baghdad and Aleppo along the Euphrates was completed, the railway could not be extended south of Mosul in A or north of Samarra in B; even afterward, both powers’ consent would be required. Britain also received the right to construct, administer, and exclusively own a railway from Haifa to B, with a permanent right to transport troops along it.

The text also guaranteed water supplies to B from the Tigris and Euphrates in A. Britain and France pledged not to transfer rights in their respective areas to a third country without the other’s consent. The arrangements for French rights were also linked to Britain’s undertaking not to transfer Cyprus unilaterally. These provisions connected infrastructure, military transport, and diplomatic exchange, but do not establish that the proposed lines had been built or water actually delivered.

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The postwar system did not reproduce the 1916 design provision by provision. On December 23, 1920, Britain and France concluded a further convention in Paris, based on their division of mandate responsibilities: Britain in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and France in Syria and Lebanon. The signatories were Hardinge for Britain and Georges Leygues for France.

The new convention specified the course of boundaries and required a commission to mark them on the ground and produce maps and a report. Disputes could be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. Joint railway use, pipelines, and the possibility that upstream irrigation would reduce downstream flows continued to require special arrangements. The 1916 proposals for international administration and spheres of influence must therefore be distinguished from the new mandate documents and subsequent boundary procedures.

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Implementation of the Syria–Palestine boundary offers a traceable example. After completing its fieldwork, the boundary commission produced a report in Beirut on February 3, 1922, accompanied by three maps at a scale of 1:50,000. On March 7, 1923, Britain and France exchanged notes in Paris approving its recommendations. The British note explicitly stated that it was equivalent to ratification and called for instructions to the high commissioner for Palestine to bring the arrangement into effect on March 10. The report, approval, and entry into force thus had distinct, specified dates.

The report described the boundary along ridges, valleys, roads, and boundary markers, rather than merely drawing an abstract straight line. Attached conditions required fair compensation for owners or occupiers if works on the Palestine side raised lake levels and flooded land. Existing rights of Syrian inhabitants to use Jordan River water were protected, while inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon retained fishing and navigation rights in specified waters. These provisions show that a boundary on the ground also affected livelihoods, movement, and resource use.

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Assessment must distinguish the wartime division of interests, postwar legal instruments, and local implementation. The 1916 text certainly expressed British and French dominance over the region’s political future. Later mandates, boundary commissions, and exchanges of ratifying notes nevertheless altered or specified the arrangements. Attributing every present-day boundary and conflict directly to a 1916 map erases subsequent negotiations, implementation, and disputes.

Loevy particularly emphasizes that railways, ports, and irrigation were not incidental details but central to the regional order the two powers envisaged. Reading her study alongside the original documents reveals the distribution of colonial power while distinguishing proposed rights from provisions that entered approval and implementation procedures. Even the latter did not mean that every right of local inhabitants was actually protected.

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