The Treaty of San Stefano: Conclusion and Revision at Berlin

The Treaty of San Stefano was a preliminary peace concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1877–1878. Russian military victory placed the Ottoman government in a position of having to accept major territorial and political changes. The parties signed the document at San Stefano, near Constantinople, on March 3, 1878. It also gives February 19 in the Russian calendar; both dates refer to the same signing.

Russia’s plenipotentiaries were Nikolai Ignatiev and Alexander Nelidov. Ottoman foreign minister Safvet Pasha and ambassador to Germany Sadullah Bey signed for the Ottoman side. Although formally restoring peace between the two empires, the document also arranged the political status and boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and other areas, extending its impact far beyond a bilateral cessation of hostilities.

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Article 29 required ratification by both sovereigns and exchange of the instruments in St. Petersburg within fifteen days or sooner. It also expressly stated that the parties became formally bound upon ratification. Although the preliminary peace reserved a later procedure for adopting the form of a definitive peace treaty, it was not merely a nonbinding memorandum of negotiating intentions.

Both Russian envoy Shuvalov’s letter to the British foreign secretary and US minister to the Ottoman Empire Horace Maynard’s report record the exchange of ratifications in St. Petersburg on March 17. Maynard also noted that Ottoman special envoy Rauf Pasha returned on March 24 with Osman Pasha, the captured defender of Pleven. This provides a concrete example of people returning after ratification, without establishing that every provision had been implemented.

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Article 6 proposed an autonomous Bulgarian principality tributary to the sultan, with a Christian government and national militia. Its territory included lands south of the Danube and extended into parts of Thrace and most of Macedonia. A Russo-Ottoman commission was still to demarcate the precise boundary on the ground, considering the composition of border populations, terrain, and local communications. The treaty map alone did not establish every administrative boundary.

Article 7 provided for inhabitants to elect a prince, subject to confirmation by the sultan and the agreement of the great powers. An assembly of notables would draft the administrative organization under a Russian commissioner's supervision and in the presence of an Ottoman commissioner. Article 8 required Ottoman troops to withdraw and allowed a Russian force of no more than 50,000 to remain for approximately two years, supported at the occupied territory’s expense. Autonomy was thus linked to Russian occupation, financial burdens, and external supervision.

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Articles 2, 3, and 5 recognized the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania respectively, making arrangements for certain boundaries and bilateral relations. These states’ rights still required specification through boundary commissions, additional agreements, and other procedures. Russo-Ottoman signatures could not automatically resolve competing territorial claims among local parties.

Article 19 set total compensation at 1.41 billion rubles, most of it to be offset by territory. The treaty included Kars, Ardahan, Batum, and other places in the cessions and allowed Russia to use the relevant territory in Dobruja in exchange for parts of Bessarabia lost in 1856. Payment of the remaining indemnity and assessment of private claims were left to further agreements or review. The nominal total therefore cannot be treated as cash already received.

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The treaty dealt with more than boundaries. Article 11 allowed Muslims and other owners moving outside the principality to retain their land and entrust its management to others, with disputed ownership referred to a commission. Article 9 required the new principality to assume obligations toward the relevant railway companies. Article 13 required restoration of navigation through the Sulina channel and settlement of shipping losses, while Article 24 guaranteed passage through the straits for neutral merchant vessels traveling to and from Russian ports.

These clauses sought to maintain population movements, property relations, and commerce, but a gap remained between specifying rights and actually protecting them. Articles 25 and 26 connected withdrawal deadlines with administrative authority during occupation and the restoration of Ottoman jurisdiction. Article 28 arranged the return of prisoners of war. Implementing peace therefore required local handovers, transport, and property assessments, rather than completion of everything on the day of signature.

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Britain and other powers opposed the extensive Bulgarian proposal. Tzouvala’s study of international law and the Balkans explains that Salisbury feared expanded Russian political and commercial influence and also demanded collective action on the grounds that Russia and the Ottoman Empire could not alter existing international treaties alone. The powers signed the Treaty of Berlin on July 13 that year, substantially revising the earlier arrangements.

The Berlin treaty reduced the Bulgarian principality and established Eastern Rumelia to its south, with administrative autonomy but under the sultan’s direct political and military authority. It reduced the Russian occupation of both areas to nine months after the exchange of ratifications. Maynard’s September report already recorded Russian withdrawal from the vicinity of Constantinople and Ottoman troops taking over some evacuated areas, while noting serious conflict in several provinces. The extensive state-building plan of San Stefano was therefore not implemented unchanged. Subsequent negotiations and local handovers reshaped the postwar order.

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