From policy recommendations to treaty negotiations
The Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence is commonly known as the Istanbul Convention. Its preparation built on the Council of Europe's earlier work against violence. A 2002 recommendation by the Committee of Ministers called for comprehensive policies, and the 2005 Warsaw Summit promoted a campaign operating at several levels. Subsequent assessments concluded that improvements in criminal-law responses alone could not fill gaps in victim services, and that binding common standards were needed.
In December 2008, the Ministers' Deputies approved the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, or CAHVIO. The committee held six drafting meetings beginning in December 2009 and adopted a draft in December 2010. The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted the text on 7 April 2011. On 11 May, the Convention was opened for signature at the Committee of Ministers' 121st Session in Istanbul.
Ratification and entry into force after signature
Opening for signature did not immediately impose the full treaty obligations on every signatory. Article 75 required signatories to ratify, accept or approve the Convention and deposit the relevant instrument with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Initial entry into force also required a collective threshold: ten signatories had to consent to be bound, including at least eight Council of Europe member states. A three-month waiting period followed, with entry into force on the first day of the next month.
This process was completed on 1 August 2014. Austria's experience illustrates the three stages: signature on 11 May 2011, ratification on 14 November 2013, and application from 1 August 2014. Article 75 also calculated separate entry-into-force dates for countries ratifying later. Consequently, years could separate the Convention's general entry into force from the date on which a particular country became bound.
Making protection part of institutions and budgets
The Convention addresses violence in both the public sphere and private relationships. Its definition of domestic violence includes physical, sexual, psychological and economic harm, applies to current or former spouses and partners, and does not require shared residence. Article 5 requires states to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish relevant violence perpetrated by private actors and to provide reparation. Responsibility for protection cannot be confined to restraining public officials.
Articles 7–11 require coordinated policies, adequate funding and personnel, recognition of the role of non-governmental organizations, designated official coordinating bodies and data collection. Articles 18–25 further specify practical services: information victims can understand, specialist support, sufficient accessible shelters, free round-the-clock helplines and sexual-violence referral centres. Access to services should not depend on a victim's willingness to press charges or testify.
References: [1]
Substantive law and immediate safety measures
The Convention requires criminal liability for conduct including physical violence, forced marriage and non-consensual sexual acts. Article 36 treats consent as a decision made freely and voluntarily in the circumstances concerned, and extends protection to current or former spouses and partners. Article 40 allows criminal or other legal sanctions for sexual harassment. These provisions have distinct wording; they cannot all be reduced to a single model of punishment.
Procedural safeguards are equally important. Article 48 requires the prohibition of mandatory alternative processes such as mediation and conciliation. Article 51 requires relevant authorities to assess risks of lethality and repeat violence. In situations of immediate danger, Article 52 requires that authorities have the power to order a perpetrator to leave the victim's residence and prohibit contact. Article 53 requires protection orders to be available promptly, without undue financial or administrative burdens, and effective sanctions for breaches.
References: [1]
The monitoring bodies begin work
Articles 66–68 establish two types of body: the independent Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as GREVIO, and the Committee of the Parties, composed of representatives of the parties. The expert group reviews state reports, may receive information from civil society and organize visits, and publishes its conclusions after hearing the state concerned. The Committee of the Parties can then make recommendations for implementation. States are thus both the providers of reports and the subjects of scrutiny.
The first ten experts were elected in Strasbourg in May 2015 and held their first meeting in September. In March 2016, Austria and Monaco became the first countries to receive baseline evaluation questionnaires. Their reports were published in September 2017. The treaty's monitoring provisions had thereby become a practical process of questionnaires, visits, responses and public evaluations.
Implementation gaps revealed by the first round
The 2017 evaluation of Austria drew on the state report, a joint report by non-governmental organizations, dialogue and a five-day visit, examining the situation up to February of that year. The expert group welcomed Austria's emergency barring and protection orders and its domestic-violence support services in all nine provinces. At the same time, it identified weaker services and institutional cooperation for other forms of violence, including sexual violence and forced marriage, while women with disabilities and those with insecure residence status still faced obstacles to obtaining help.
The report also found that the coordinating body and national action plan lacked commensurate resources. These findings, which relate to a defined period, show that budgets, service accessibility and judicial responses still need examination after ratification. Even countries with existing protection systems may retain gaps in coverage and capacity to implement them.
References: [4]