A joint declaration issued from Potsdam
On 26 July 1945, the heads of government of the United States, China and Britain issued the Potsdam Declaration, presenting Japan with terms for ending the war. It appeared in the names of US President Truman, Chinese National Government Chairman Chiang Kai-shek and British Prime Minister Churchill. The Soviet Union endorsed it in its declaration of war against Japan on 8 August.
The declaration accompanied both military pressure and efforts to induce surrender. Drawing on US staff records, Ray Cline writes that preparations for invading Japan continued during the Potsdam conference, while the declaration sought to weaken Japanese willingness to resist as military forces concentrated. Announcing terms did not immediately end the war.
Three-country consultation by telegram
The three countries did not agree through a signing ceremony at which all were present. On 24 July, Truman telegraphed Ambassador Patrick Hurley in China from Babelsberg, asking him to present the proposed text to Chiang and obtain a prompt reply. On 26 July, Hurley reported that he had secured agreement at Huangshan near Chongqing.
Chiang proposed changing the leaders' titles in paragraph 1 to place the Chairman of China's National Government alongside the US President and British Prime Minister. Hurley crossed the Yangtze back to Chongqing to transmit the message through naval and army communications channels. The final text opened with the three leaders in parallel. Although named for Potsdam, China's participation occurred through its US diplomatic interlocutor and telecommunications.
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Surrender conditions and post-war objectives
The thirteen paragraphs linked disarmament and political reconstruction. Paragraphs 6 and 7 called for removal of the power and influence of those responsible for wars of conquest and militarism, with occupation of designated points to secure the objectives. Paragraph 8 required fulfilment of the Cairo Declaration and limited Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and smaller islands determined by the Allies.
Paragraphs 9–11 allowed disarmed servicemen to return home, required punishment of war criminals and protection of fundamental freedoms, and permitted industries needed for a peaceful economy and reparations in kind. Paragraph 12 linked withdrawal to fulfilment of these aims and establishment of a peaceful, responsible government according to the people's freely expressed will. The final paragraph required Japan's government to proclaim unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. Conditions for ending occupation were given, but no fixed withdrawal date.
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The Emperor in the August diplomatic notes
On 10 August, Japan communicated through Switzerland its willingness to accept, with the understanding that this would not prejudice the Emperor's prerogatives as sovereign ruler, and requested a clear Allied response. On 11 August, US Secretary of State James Byrnes replied for the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China: after surrender, the Emperor's and government's authority would be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, while Japan's final governmental form would follow the people's freely expressed will.
Japan's formal reply on 14 August promised imperial authorization for the government and Imperial General Headquarters to sign documents needed to implement the declaration, and orders for forces everywhere to cease combat and surrender weapons. Byrnes replied the same day, treating this as acceptance of the declaration and the 11 August statement. He requested fully authorized representatives and informed Japan that MacArthur had been appointed to receive and implement the surrender.
References: [2]
From acceptance to the surrender instrument
On 2 September, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Yoshijirō Umezu signed the Instrument of Surrender for Japan in Tokyo Bay, with MacArthur and Allied representatives accepting. Its opening expressly accepted the 26 July declaration and the Soviet Union's subsequent adherence, pledging good-faith fulfilment by Japan's Emperor, government and successors.
Implementation obligations became more specific. Japanese forces everywhere had to cease hostilities, preserve ships and military and civilian property, obey the Supreme Commander's orders, and release, protect and transport Allied prisoners of war and detained civilians. Publication of terms in July, diplomatic acceptance in August and formal signature in September were distinct steps, not a process completed by one signature.
Occupation required additional plans and orders
The declaration did not supply every implementation detail. Staff records studied by Cline show that on 9 August the US side was still urgently preparing the formal surrender instrument and General Order No. 1. MacArthur's and Nimitz's occupation plans also needed coordination. The revised Blacklist plan was then implemented, turning diplomatic acceptance into troop entry and assumption of control.
Approved by Truman on 6 September, the initial US post-surrender policy made disarmament, abolition of militarist institutions and promotion of civil liberties occupation tasks. It allowed the Supreme Commander to exercise authority through existing Japanese government machinery and intervene directly when necessary. The document explicitly stated that using the existing government did not guarantee its preservation unchanged. Political aims in the declaration still required gradual implementation through occupation institutions, Japanese administration and subsequent reforms.