Rapprochement Through Military Channels
In the mid-1930s, German-Japanese rapprochement advanced through overlapping military and diplomatic channels. Kunihiko Aoki's review of the documentary record shows that Germany's policies toward China and Japan had competed. A proposal for joint German-Japanese-Chinese cooperation against communism emerged at one point but failed as Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated, leaving bilateral German-Japanese negotiations. The pact's formation therefore cannot be understood as a process in which all three countries shared a common course from the outset.
Contacts between Hiroshi Ōshima, Japan's military attaché in Berlin, and Ribbentrop were an important negotiating channel. Military intelligence services were also building networks directed against the Soviet Union, bringing together efforts promoted by Germany's Canaris and the Japanese military. The public anticommunist rationale could connect these interests, but it did not eliminate differences among departments or between the two governments.
Signature and Entry into Force in 1936
On November 25, 1936, Japanese Ambassador to Germany Kintomo Mushanokōji and German plenipotentiary Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. Ribbentrop's formal title in the document at that time was ambassador plenipotentiary. The German and Japanese texts were equally authentic, and Article III explicitly stated that the agreement took effect on the date of signature and remained valid for five years.
Contemporary reports cited by Aoki record that the draft had been initialed on October 23 and approved by Japan's Privy Council on the morning of November 25, before the formal signing in Berlin. Domestic deliberation, initialing, and formal signature are distinct stages. The agreement did not defer entry into force until an exchange of ratifications, and no such additional exchange date can be inferred from its provisions.
Public Anticommunism and Secret Soviet Arrangements
The public text provided for sharing intelligence on Comintern activities, consulting on responses, and jointly inviting other countries to participate. A supplementary protocol required close cooperation among the responsible authorities, severe measures against relevant individuals within the limits of each country's existing laws, and the proposed creation of a standing committee. These provisions supplied a framework for intelligence exchange and political repression but did not impose automatic joint participation in war.
The secret supplementary agreement concerned the Soviet Union: if one party faced an unprovoked Soviet attack or threat of attack, the other was to refrain from measures that would ease the Soviet Union's position and enter into immediate consultations. American Ambassador to Germany William Dodd recorded that day that German Foreign Minister Neurath had told him there were no secret clauses. Documents subsequently released revealed additional arrangements. Public explanations and the full set of commitments were not the same thing.
From a Framework to Specific Military Contacts
After the pact, military intelligence cooperation advanced through further specific contacts. Shingo Masunaga's study shows that on February 12, 1937, Germany's military attaché in Japan met the Second Department of the Japanese Army General Staff, giving concrete form to cooperation in exchanging operational plans, intelligence on the Soviet Union, covert operations, military equipment, and training. A supplementary arrangement between Canaris and Ōshima followed on May 11, and another agreement between Ōshima and Keitel appeared in October 1938.
These later documents show that cooperation did not become operational automatically upon signature. Military attachés, intelligence services, and general staffs had to implement its elements individually, and plans cannot all be treated as successful operations. The study continues to stress gaps in the evidence regarding the effectiveness of intelligence activities in the Baltic region. The pact should therefore not be described as a fully efficient, unified system of clandestine operations.
References: [4]
The Legal Form of Italy's Accession
On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the pact and its public supplementary protocol through a tripartite protocol signed in Rome. Article II stipulated that Italy was to be regarded as an original signatory, with its signature having the same effect as signature of the original text. Article IV provided for immediate implementation that day. Japan promulgated the document on November 10, so the publication date differed from the dates of accession and entry into force.
This accession process broadened cooperation between Berlin and Tokyo into a three-way political relationship among Germany, Italy, and Japan. The 1936 pact must nevertheless be distinguished from the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Expanding the list of signatories did not automatically create a unified command, nor does it establish that the new participant assumed all the obligations of the secret German-Japanese arrangements.
The Rupture of 1939 and Renewal in 1941
Germany's rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1939 exposed contradictions between anticommunist commitments and national strategy. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's memorandum of a conversation on August 26 records the Japanese ambassador saying that Tokyo had decided the previous day to stop negotiations with Germany and Italy on further strengthening relations and was reconsidering its foreign policy in light of changes in Europe. This diplomatic record reveals an actual response, rather than assuming continuing unity among the countries from the pact's name alone.
The pact was nevertheless renewed in Berlin on November 25, 1941, with Finland and other countries joining at the same time. The American minister in Finland had previously reported that the Finnish foreign minister emphasized that accession did not signify a change in the country's political position. Whether or not this assurance was entirely credible, it suggests that the same anticommunist framework could accommodate different intentions. The pact served alliance-building and propaganda purposes, but membership, military cooperation, and national choices about war cannot simply be equated.